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FACULTY COMMENT
Assassinating Saddam: A Post-War View
From International Law
Louis RENA BERES*
As the Gulf crisis turned into the Gulf War, Americans looked with
renewed interest to quick-fix solutions. Predictably, one of the most pop-
ular solutions centered on assassination of the offending figure, Iraq's
Saddam Hussein. Whether or not such high-level political killing would
have been in the overall best interests of the United States or its allies is
certainly a vital question, but one I will now leave for others. The ques-
tion to be considered here asks only if such an assassination would have
been permissible under international law.
Understood as tyrannicide (killing a tyrant) within a country, assas-
sination has often been accepted as lawful. Support for such a form of
assassination can be found in Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's Lives, and
Cicero's De Officiis. According to Cicero:
There can be no such thing as fellowship with tyrants, nothing but
bitter feud is possible: and it is not repugnant to nature to despoil, if
you can, those whom it is a virtue to kill; nay, this pestilent and god-
less brood should be utterly banished from human society. For, as we
amputate a limb in which the blood and the vital spirit have ceased to
circulate, because it injures the rest of the body, so monsters, who
under human guise, conceal the cruelty and ferocity of a wild beast,
should be severed from the common body of humanity.'
The 18th Century Swiss scholar, Emmerich Vattel, in his The Law of
Nations, recalls "the essential object of civil society" is to "work in con-
cert for the common good of all." Hence, he inquires:
Could the society make use of its authority to deliver irrevocably itself
and all its members to the discretion of a cruel tyrant? Surely not,
since it would lose all rights of its own if it undertook to oppress any
part of the citizens. When, therefore, it confers the supreme and abso-
Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue University; B.A., 1967,
Queens College of New York; Ph.D., 1971, Princeton University.
1. CicERo, DE OFFICIlS (cited in THE TERRORISM READER 16 (W. Laqueur ed. 1978)).
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lute power of government without express reserve, there is necessarily
an implied reserve that the sovereign will use that power for the wel-
fare of the people and not for their destruction. If he makes himself
the scourge of the State, he disgraces himself; he becomes no better
than a public enemy, against whom the Nation can and should defend
itself. And, if he has carried his tyranny to the extreme, why should
the life itself, of so cruel and faithless an enemy, be spared? 2
Even before Vattel, the English poet, John Milton accepted the argu-
ment of tyrannicide in justifying the execution of Charles I. According to
Milton's Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, "[t]yrannicide, that is the
killing of a tyrant, is not only lawful, but also laudable. ' '3 Of course, as a
practical matter, the criteria that can clearly distinguish tyrannical from
non-tyrannical rule are very difficult to identify. When John Wilkes
Booth leaped onto the stage at Ford Theater after assassinating President
Lincoln, he shouted: "Sic semper tyrannis." Thus always to tyrants!
Without appropriate criteria of differentiation, judgments concerning
tyrannicide are inevitably personal and subjective. The hero of Albert
Camus' The Just Assassins, Ivan Kaliayev, a fictional adaptation of the
assassin of the Grand Duke Sergei, says that he threw bombs, not at hu-
manity, but at tyranny. How shall he be judged? Seneca is reputed, to
have said that no offering can be more agreeable to God than the blood of
a tyrant. But, who is to determine authoritatively that a particular leader
is indeed a tyrant? Dante confined the murderers of Julius Caesar to the
very depths of hell, but the Renaissance rescued them and the Enlighten-
ment even made them heroes. In the 16th century, tyrannicide became a
primary issue in the writings of the Monarchomachs, a school of mainly
French Protestant writers. The best-known of their pamphlets was
Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, published in 1579 under the pen name of Ju-
nius Brutus.'
The most well-known British works on tyrannicide are George
Buchanan's De Jure Regni Apud Scotos, published in London in 1579,
and Saxby's Killing No Murder, which appeared in 1657. Juan de Mari-
ana, in The King and the Education of the King, says:
[B]oth the philosophers and theologians agree, that the prince who
seizes the state with force and arms, and with no legal right, no pub-
lic, civic approval, may be killed by anyone and deprived of his life
and position. Since he is a public enemy and, afflicts his fatherland
with every evil, since truly, and in a proper sense, he is clothed with
the title and character of tyrant, he may be removed by any means
and gotten rid of by as much violence as he used in seizing his power.5
2. E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 18 (1844) (cited in BOOK I, C. Fenwick trans., Car-
negie Institution of Washington, at 24, (1916)).
3. J. MILTON, TENURE OF KINGS AND MAGISTRATES (1648).
4. The pen name, Junius Brutus, was probably Duplessis Mornay, a political advisor to
the King of Navarre.
5. J. DE MARIANA, THE KING AND THE EDUCATION OF THE KING (1699).
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In the 19th century, a principle of granting asylum to those whose
crimes were "political" was established in Europe and in Latin America.
This principle is known as the political offense exception to extradition. A
specific exemption from the protection of the political offense exception
- in effect, an exception to the exception - was made for the assassins
of heads of state and for attempted regicides. At the 1937 Convention for
the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism, the murder of a head of
state, or of any family member of a head of state, was formally designated
as a criminal act of terrorism.6
The so-called "attentat" clause, which resulted from an attempt on
6. For current conventions in force concerning terrorism, see Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, reprinted in 13 I.L.M.
43 (1974) (entered into force for the United States, Feb. 20, 1977); Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95;
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Con-
vention), Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force for the United
States, Dec. 4, 1969); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 (entered into force for
the United States on Jan. 26, 1973); International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/3446 (1979)
(entered into force for the United States, Dec. 7, 1984); European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism of Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. 90. On December 9, 1985, the U.N.
General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as
"criminal." Never before had the General Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolu-
tion on this question. Yet, the issue of particular acts that actually constitute terrorism was
left largely unaddressed, except for acts such as hijacking, hostage-taking, and attacks on
internationally protected persons that were criminalized by previous custom and conven-
tions. See United Nations Resolution on Terrorism, G.A.Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/4053 (1985).
7. The "attentat" clause, included in many treaties, provides that the killing of the
head of a foreign government or a member of his family is not to be considered a political
offense. Some treaties extend the exclusion to any murder or to attempts on any life. Here,
the political offense exception to extradition is excluded wherever any killing has taken
place. In the absence of an attentat clause in a particular treaty, a state may refuse to
extradite persons requested by another state on the grounds that the crime in question was
political.
According to the European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, Europ. T.S. 24,
359 U.N.T.S. 273, 3, "The taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head of State or a
member of his family shall not be deemed to be a political offense for the purposes of this
Convention."
Most extradition treaties deny extradition of persons accused or convicted of relative
political offenses (i.e., offenses involving one or several common crimes connected with a
political act). Assassination is an example of such an offense. The courts of particular states
solve the problem of applicability of nonextradition of political criminals by ascertaining the
degree of connection between the common crime and the political act. Whether or not the
degree of connection required for the act is to be regarded as political, and thus nonex-
traditable, depends entirely upon the particular test adopted by each individual state.
There are three fundamental tests here: (1) the "incidence test" of Anglo-American law,
which requires that the crime be part of, or incidental to, a political revolt or disturbance
(although Anglo-American decisions involving East European refugees have indicated that
extradition will be denied even in the absence of a political revolt or disturbance when the
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the life of French Emperor Napoleon III, and later widened in response
to the assassination of President James Garfield in the U.S., limited the
political offense exception in international law to preserve social order.
Murder of a head of state or members of the head of state's family was
thus designated as a common crime, and this designation has been incor-
porated into article 3 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition.
Yet, we are always reminded of the fundamental and ancient right to ty-
rannicide, especially in the post-Holocaust/post-Nuremberg world order.
It follows that one could argue persuasively under international law that
the right to tyrannicide is still overriding and that the specific prohibi-
tions in international treaties are not always binding.
From the standpoint of international law, assassination can become
an international crime (possibly an instance of terrorism) when it is car-
ried out against a state official, by a national of the same state and within
the territory of the state, only where the assassin flees to another state
and requests for extradition are issued. If, however, the assassination is
carried out by a national of another state, whether the location of the
killing is the territory of the victim, the territory of the perpetrator, or
some other state altogether, it is immediately a matter of international
law. Although such an assassination is almost always a crime under inter-
national law, it could conceivably be an instance of a very limited right of
"humanitarian intervention." For this to be the case, it would be neces-
sary, inter alia, that the victim was guilty of egregious crimes against
human rights, that these crimes were generally recognized and widely-
documented, and that no other means existed to support the restoration
of basic human rights.
To this point we have been dealing with assassination as tyrannicide
(i.e., with the killing of a head of state or high official by a national of the
same state). We have seen that support for such forms of assassination
can be found in certain established traditions in political philosophy but
that there is virtually no support in the prevailing international law of
extradition. Although some treaties are vague enough that such assassina-
tion might be interpreted as a political offense, and therefore not subject
to extradition requests, others subscribe to the attentat principle which
provides a specific exception to the exception - cases which involve the
assassination of heads of state or their families.
Another possible line of support for assassination as tyrannicide can
possibility of political persecution can reasonably be demonstrated), (2) the "political objec-
tive test" of French law, which requires that the crime be directed against the political
organization or structure of the state; and (3) the "political motivation test" of Swiss law,
which requires that the crime be assessed in light of the predominant surrounding circum-
stances and especially the motivations of the offender.
A number of treaties in force stipulate that, for purposes of extradition, political of-
fenses shall not include crimes against humanity, certain crimes of war identified in the
1949 Geneva Conventions and comparable violations of the laws of war not already provided
for in these conventions.
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be extrapolated from the current international law of human rights." De-
spite the existence of a well-developed and precisely codified regime of
human rights protections, victims of human rights abuse in particular
states have little, if any, redress under international law. Indeed, in the
absence of an effective centralized enforcement capability, international
law relies upon insurgency9 and humanitarian intervention'0 as the ulti-
mate guarantors of essential human rights. It follows that where humani-
8. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954). This Convention
should be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted
by the General Assembly on Dec. 16, 1966, and entered into force Oct. 4, 1967. See also
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No.
8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force for the United States, July 7, 1976); Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res 1514 (XV), 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); Interna-
tional Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, G.A.Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, O.A.S: Off. Rec. OEA/
Ser. L/VIII. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979) (entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
673 (1970). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - known collectively as the Inter-
national Bill of Rights - serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of human
rights.
9. International law makes clear that not all forms of insurgency are impermissible
(i.e., terroristic). Although the U.N. General Assembly and specially constituted U.N. com-
mittees have repeatedly condemned acts of international terrorism, they exempt those activ-
ities that derive from "the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all
peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination and the legit-
imacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accor-
dance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the
organs of the United Nations." This exemption, from the 1973 General Assembly Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, is corroborated by Article 7 of the Gen-
eral Assembly's 1974 Definition of-Aggression. In this connection, see Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 355, U.N. Doc. A/
9028 (1973); Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A.Res. 3314
(XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) reprinted in 13
I.L.M. 710 (1974). Article 7 refers to the Oct. 24, 1970, Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. G.A.Res. 2625
(XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 1292 (1970). For a comprehensive and authoritative inventory of sources of interna-
tional law concerning the right to use force on behalf of self-determination, see Aureliu Cris-
tescu, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development
on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981).
10. See generally F.TEsoN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1988); Nanda, Humanitarian
Military Intervention, 23 WORLDVIEW, Oct. 1980, at 23.
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tarian intervention cannot be reasonably expected, individuals within
states have only themselves to provide for proper enforcement of their
codified human rights.
What about "humanitarian intervention" and assassination? Can
agents of one state legally assassinate officials of other states under the
rules of humanitarian intervention? Or is such assassination always a per
se violation of international law?
To a certain extent, the answers to these questions depend upon the
absence or presence of a condition of belligerency (war) between the
states involved.1 1 In the absence of this condition, assassination of politi-
cal figures in another state may represent a crime of aggression or terror-
ism. Regarding aggression, Article 1 of the 1974 U.N. Resolution on the
Definition of Aggression defines this crime, as ". . the use of armed force
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition."' 2 In view of
the binding rule of nonintervention codified in the Charter that would
normally be violated by transnational assassination, such killing would
generally qualify as aggression. Moreover, assuming that transnational as-
sassination constitutes an example of "armed force," the criminalization,
as aggression, of such activity may also be extrapolated from article 2 of
the Definition of Aggression: "The first use of armed force by a State in
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an
act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with
the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has
been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant cir-
cumstances .... 13
Let us now turn to the status of transnational assassination under
international law when a condition of war exists between the states in-
11. Under international law, the question of whether or not a state of war actually ex-
ists between states is somewhat ambiguous. Traditionally, it was held that a formal declara-
tion of war was a necessary condition before "formal" war could be said to exist. Hugo
Grotius, for example, divided wars into declared wars, which were legal, and undeclared
wars, which were not. (See GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, BK. III, ch. iii, V and XI).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the position that war obtains legitimacy only
after a conclusive declaration of war by one of the parties was codified by Hague Convention
III. More precisely, this convention stipulated that hostilities must not commence without
"previous and explicit warning" in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum. (See
Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 1907, 3 NRGT, 3 series, 437,
article 1.) Currently, of course, declaration of war may be tantamount to declarations of
international criminality (because of the criminalization of aggression by authoritative inter-
national law), and it could be a jurisprudential absurdity to tie a state of war to formal
declarations of belligerency. It follows that a state of war may exist without formal declara-
tions, but only if there is an armed conflict between two or more states and/or at least one
of these states considers itself at war.
12. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.




volved. According to article 23(b) of the regulations annexed to the fourth
Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land: "It is
especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously, individuals be-
longing to the hostile nation or army."' " The U.S. Army Field Manual has
incorporated this prohibition authoritatively linking Hague article 23(b)
to assassination at paragraph 31: "This article is construed as prohibiting
assassination, proscription or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price
upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy 'dead or
alive.' "s
From the point of the convergence between international and U.S.
municipal law,"6 the Hague Convention IV is a treaty of the United States
that has received the advice and consent of the Senate and is, therefore,
the "supreme law of the land" under article 6 of the Constitution (the
"Supremacy Clause"). Indeed, even if Congress were to enact a statute
that expressly repealed the rule found at Hague Regulation article 23(b),
that would not permit U.S. officials to legalize assassinations. This is be-
cause, among other things, the Nuremberg Tribunal (1945) expressly
ruled that the obligations codified at the Hague Regulations had entered
into customary international law as of 1939."'
It appears, then, impossible for any state to legalize assassination,
and the leaders of any recalcitrant state would seem to be subject to pros-
ecution (as hostes humani generis, "common enemies of mankind") in
14. The Hague Convention IV, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(b), 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536,
reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1908).
15. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, 31.
16. There are many sources that point to the convergence of national and international
law. According to article 6 of the Constitution, "All treaties made.., under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land .... " Although article 6 refers
exclusively to treaties, the process of incorporation has also been extended by several deci-
sions of the Supreme Court to international law in general. As this means that all of the
international rules against assassination are now the law of the United States, any attempt
to "modify" prohibitions against assassination would also appear to be in violation of Amer-
ican municipal law.
Those who would ask for a broader "right" of assassination should also be reminded
that the president of the United States has taken an oath required by article 2, section 1,
clause 7 of the Constitution "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." Article 6 and pertinent Supreme Court decisions signal that the President is sworn
to uphold the international law prohibitions concerning assassination. Similarly, article 2,
section 3 requires the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," a charge
that normally extends to respect for the lives of public officials in other states, even those
we may find objectionable.
17. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946), at 1144. From the point
of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obligations are, in a sense, doubly binding.
This is the case because these obligations represent not only current normative obligations
of international law, but also the higher law obligations engendered by the American politi-
cal tradition. By its codification of the principle that fundamental human rights are not an
internal question for each State, but an imperious postulate of the international community,
the. Nuremberg obligations represent a point of perfect convergence between the law of na-
tions and the jurisprudential/ethical foundations of the American Republic.
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any state that claimed appropriate jurisdiction.' s Significantly, U.S. law
recognizes and reinforces these obligations under international law. Ac-
cbrding to paragraph 498 of The U.S. Army Field Manual, any person,
whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, who commits an act
that constitutes a crime under international law, is responsible for the
crime and is liable to punishment. 9 Paragraph 501 of the same manual,
based upon the well-known judgment of Japanese General Yamashita,
stipulates that any U.S. government official who had actual knowledge, or
should have had knowledge, that troops or other persons under his con-
trol were compliant in war crimes and failed to take necessary steps to
protect the laws of war was himself guilty of a war crime.2" Finally, para-
graph 510 denies the defense of "act of state" to such alleged criminals by
providing that, though a person who committed an act constituting an
international crime may have acted as head of state or as a responsible
government official, he is not relieved, thereby, from responsibility for
that act.2'
These facts notwithstanding, there are circumstances wherein the ex-
pectations of the authoritative human rights regime must override the
ordinary prohibitions against transnational assassination - both the
prohibitions concerning conditions of peace and conditions of war. The
most apparent of such circumstances are those involving genocide and
related crimes against humanity.22 If, after all, the assassination of a
18. The principle of universal jurisdiction is founded upon the presumption of solidar-
ity between States in the fight against crime. It is mentioned in: Coapus JuRis CIVILIS II 265
(1932); GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS I, ch. 20; VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS I 101 (1844).
The case for universal jurisdiction (which is strengthened wherever extradition is difficult or
impossible to obtain) is also built into the four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949: Ge-
neva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked in
Armed Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S.
135, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Ci-
vilians in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
This treaty unambiguously imposes upon the High Contracting Parties the obligation to
punish certain grave breaches of their rules, regardless of where the infraction was commit-
ted or the nationality of the authors of the crimes. See Convention No. 1, art. 49; Conven-
tion No. 2, art. 50; Convention No. 3, art. 129; Convention No. 4, art. 146. In further support
of universality for certain international crimes, see II M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL Ex-
TRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE, ch. 6 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984); 18 U.S.C. § III 6(c) (1982).
19. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 15, V 498.
20. Id. 1 501.
21. Id. 1 510.
22. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). The
Convention was submitted to the Senate by President Harry S. Truman in June 1949. The
Convention languished in that body until Feb. 19, 1986, when the Senate consented to ratifi-
cation with the reservation that legislation be passed that conforms U.S. law to the precise
terms of the Treaty. This enabling legislation was approved by Congress in October 1988,
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Hitler or a Pol Pot could save thousands or even millions of innocent
people from torture and murder, it would be a far greater crime not to
attempt such an assassination than to actually carry it out.
What about Saddam? Our real objection to Saddam Hussein had lit-
tle or nothing to do with his brutal pre-war reign of terror in Iraq. When
Saddam first destroyed large numbers of Kurds and other allegedly dissi-
dent Iraqis, there was barely a murmur in Washington. Indeed, the Bush
administration and certain members of Congress deliberately overlooked
these monstrous violations of human rights in the presumed interests of
an American Realpolitik.
Why, precisely, might we have sought to rid the world of this particu-
lar tyrant? Since "humanitarian intervention" did not apply, what
grounds for assassination, if any, might have existed under international
law?2" To answer this question authoritatively, we should return to the
explicitly stated pre-war goals of the United States in dealing with Iraq's
aggression. As outlined by Secretary of State Baker before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, they were:
FIRST, the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated in U.N. Security Council Reso-
lution 660;
SECOND, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
THIRD, the protection of the lives of American citizens held hostage
by Iraq, both in Iraq and in Kuwait; and
FOURTH, a commitment to the security and stability of the Persian
gulf."4
and signed by President Reagan on Nov. 4, 1988. This legislation amends the Criminal Code
of the United States to make genocide a federal offense. It also sets a maximum penalty of
life imprisonment when death results from a criminal act defined by the law. This follows
the practice of implementing legislation already well-established with respect to other cate-
gories of crimes under international law.
23. Ironically, the United Nations, which is responsible for most of the post-Nuremberg
codification of the international law of human rights, has sometimes been associated with
increased limits on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. These limits, of course, flow
from the greatly reduced justification for the use of force in the Charter's system of interna-
tional law, especially the broad prohibition contained in article 2(4). Yet, while it cannot be
denied that humanitarian intervention might be used as a pretext for naked aggression, it is
also incontestable that a "too-literal" interpretation of 2(4) would summarily destroy the
entire corpus of normative protection for human rights - a corpus that is coequal with
"peace" as the central objective of the Charter. Moreover, in view of the important nexus
between peace and human rights, a nexus in which the former is very much dependent upon
widespread respect for human dignity, a "too-literal" interpretation of 2(4) might well im-
pair the prospects for long-term security. It must be widely understood that the Charter
does not prohibit all uses of force and that certain uses are clearly permissible in pursuit of
basic human rights. Notwithstanding, its attempt to bring greater centralization to legal
processes in world politics, the Charter system has not impaired the long-standing right of
individual States to act on behalf of the international legal order. In the continuing absence
of effective central authoritative processes for decision and enforcement, the legal commu-
nity of humankind must continue to allow, indeed must continue to require humanitarian
intervention by individual States.
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These goals were, without doubt, entirely legitimate and well-
grounded in the expectations of international law. At the same time, the
U.N. Charter provides a variety of institutional collective remedies that
might have ensured Baghdad's compliance, including of course, the large-
scale military operations that were ultimately used. And even if the U.S.
and its unprecedented coalition of allies had decided to resort to "self-
help" remedies outside the bounds of the United Nations, we could,
under certain conditions, have done so lawfully through appropriate mea-
sures of "self-defense" (i.e., without resorting to assassination).
In the final analysis, there is only one scenario wherein the U.S.-or-
dered assassination of Saddam Hussein could have been consistent with
international law. This is the case in which Saddam's recognized and doc-
umented crimes against Kuwait could not have been punished and cor-
rected by U.N. action or by U.S.-led measures of "collective self-defense."
In such a case, where the only alternative to assassination would have
been to leave the aggressor undisturbed in Kuwait, a compelling brief for
killing the Baghdad tyrant might have been based on the following "gen-
eral principle of law recognized by civilized nations: 25 Nullum crimen
sine poena; "no crime without a punishment." Although it would nor-
mally be unjust to deal with Saddam by assassination, it would be even
more unjust to let his wrongs go unpunished.2 6
Of course, in making this argument, the egregious nature of Saddam
Hussein's wrongs would have been critical to justifying assassination.
Moreover, recalling the common argument that assassinating Hitler or
Pol Pot would have been law-enforcing rather than law-violating, the
brief must also have been based on the expectation that leaving Saddam
alive would almost certainly have resulted in additional crimes against
peace (aggression) and crimes against humanity. Needless to say, logi-
Committee, 101st Cong., 2d. Seas., (Oct. 17, 1990).
25. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 190 (1945).
26. Such a "general principle of law" would have the character of a peremptory or jus
cogens norm under international law. According to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, ". . . a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize
forms of insurgency protected by this peremptory norm would be invalid. According to arti-
cle 53 of the Vienna Convention, "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it con-
flicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." The concept is extended to
newly emerging peremptory norms by article 64 of the Convention: "If a new peremptory
norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that
norm becomes void and terminates." See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
22, 1969, opened for signature, May 23, 1969; U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First
and Second Sessions, Mar. 26 - May 24, 1968, and Apr. 9 - May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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cally, there is no possible way in which such expectations could have been
defended "beyond a reasonable doubt," but we now know that they would
certainly have been right on the mark.
Even if a compelling jurisprudential argument could have been made
for assassinating Saddam Hussein, it is by no means clear that such an
action would have in any way been useful. It follows that international
law must always be an essential component of any decision on such con-
troversial remedies, but that it must also be balanced with appropriate
tactical and strategic considerations.

